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duci
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Posted - 08/03/2005 :  06:48:38  Show Profile  Email Poster Send duci a Private Message  Reply with Quote
In afara organelor de stat destinate politiei domeniului nuclear, mai exact administrarea si supravegherea surselor de radiatie (in majoritate spitale), România are un reusit program energetic, inceput in 1972. Din fericire, la momentul respectiv nu s-a formulat un obiectiv excesiv de ambitios, ci doar obtinerea prin eforturi proprii a combustibilului de tip CANDU si fabricarea apei grele, urmând ca centrala sa fie construita sub licenta.

Dupa eforturi formidabile din partea colectivului de cercetatori, astazi suntem in situatia înfloritoare de a avea nu numai o centrala nucleara de tip CANDU ci si o industrie si o cercetare orizontala asociata acestui domeniu, situatie de invidiat, pe care n-a mai atins-o nici o tara din Europa de Est, în afara de Rusia si poate Ucraina.

Desigur, este vorba de centrale canadiene, CANDU, care folosesc uraniu natural si apa grea. Prin aceasta reactorii CANDU nu pun nici o problema de neproliferare (nu folosesc uraniu imbogatit) iar pretul energiei este comparabil cu cel obtinut in reactorii de tip PWR. Gradul de ardere este mic (~3000 MWzile/tona Uraniu).

Dezavantajul major al acestui segment tehnico-stiintific este lipsa de compatibilitate cu filiera PWR (Pressurized Water Reactor) dezvoltata in Europa si SUA, care s-a impus in ultimii 40 ani si care foloseste o baza materiala mult mai dezvoltata. Combustibilul contine uraniu îmbogatit iar dupa ardere combustibilul ars este reprocesat obtinându-se un ciclu combustibil avansat si grade de ardere mari. Perspectiva este de ~30000MWZile/t Uraniu.

ne convine sau nu este clar ca industria României se va integra in cea europeana, si ca urmare in urmatorii 15-20 ani, ceea ce nu este mult pentru acest fenomen social si industrial, va trebui sa ne adaptam social si tehnic la acest ciclu combustibil avansat.

Pana acum autoritatile competente nu par sa se grabeasca in a oferi populatiei bagajul necesar de cunostinte pentru a se adapta acestei restructurari a sectorului energetic, foarte scump de altfel si cu implicatii largi in domeniul financiar, economic, tehnic si stiintific.

Sa nu ramanem, iarasi, de caruta fara sa intelegem nimic dintr-un domeniu stiintific in care de fapt cercetatoii romani sunt deschizatori de drumuri.

Prof.Dr. D. Ciurchea

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duci
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Posted - 11/25/2005 :  15:02:06  Show Profile  Email Poster Send duci a Private Message  Reply with Quote
Cheia problemei, dupa mine, este formarea unui grup de specialisti care sa aduca populatia la un nivel de perceptie tehnica si politica (bine inteles ca e vorba de politica) care sa ii permita sa ia o pozitie pertinenta.

Lucrurile arata diferit in Muntenia, Transilvania si Moldova.

De curand s-a format un consortiu national pentru construirea unei strategii educationale, de perfectionare si de popularizare in domeniul nuclear, You must be logged in to see this link. , consortiu format si din reprezentanti ai "consumatorilor de educatie", adica angajatorii de absolventi. In felul acesta, nepotismele si solutiile mafiote din sistemul de invatamant vor incepe sa fie descoperite si sa dispara.
Aceasta forma de organizare, fara piramida feudale, poate constitui o forma noua de asigurare a calitatii procesului educativ, si al a sistemului de educatie si cercetare, care sufera de supraaglomeratie cu pseudo-scientisti.

Prof.Dr. D. Ciurchea
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duci
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Posted - 09/29/2007 :  15:31:05  Show Profile  Email Poster Send duci a Private Message  Reply with Quote
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Hotărâre privind modul de constituire si gestionare a resurselor financiare necesare gospodăririi în sigurantă a deseurilor radioactive si dezafectării instalatiilor nucleare si radiologice


Agentia Natională pentru Deseuri Radioactive, denumită în continuare ANDRAD, este autoritatea natională competentă în domeniul coordonării la nivel national a activitătilor de gospodărire în sigurantă a deseurilor radioactive.

ANDRAD este institutie publică de interes national, în subordinea Ministerului Economiei si Finantelor, răspunzând de depozitarea definitivă a deseurilor radioactive rezultate din operarea si dezafectarea instalatiilor nucleare din România. Activitatea ANDRAD se desfăsoară în baza Planului Anual de Activităti (PAA), care este elaborat în baza Strategiei nationale pe termen mediu si lung privind gospodărirea combustibilului nuclear uzat si a deseurilor radioactive, inclusiv depozitarea definitivă si dezafectarea instalatiilor nucleare si radiologice.

În prezent finantarea activitătilor ANDRAD se realizează din contributiile plătite de marii generatori de deseuri radioactive în baza Hotărârii Guvernului nr.123/2007 si a Ordinului ministrului finantelor publice nr.1255/622/2004 pentru aprobarea Normelor metodologice privind modul de colectare a contributiilor directe anuale ale titularilor de autorizatie nucleară si de utilizare a veniturilor extrabugetare din care se finantează activitatea Agentiei Nationale pentru Deseuri Radioactive;

Prin art.III Legea nr.26/2007 care aprobă cu modificări si completări Ordonanta Guvernului nr.31/2006, se stabilesc criteriile de plată si obligativitatea ANDRAD ca în 120 de zile de la publicare să înainteze proiectul de Hotărâre a Guvernului privind stabilirea cuantumului contributiei producătorilor de deseuri.

Practica în tările UE recomandă constituirea fondurilor de dezafectare si gospodărire a deseurilor radioactive.

Fondurile astfel constituite trebuie să fie suficiente să acopere integral cheltuielile estimate si să fie gestionate transparent.

În România, Legea nr.111/1996 privind desfăsurarea în sigurantă, reglementarea, autorizarea si controlul activitătilor nucleare, republicată, prevede înfiintarea acestor fonduri încă din 1996, constituirea lor fiind o cerintă a Uniunii Europene mentionată în raportul de tară din 2005 si asumată de România prin ratificarea Conventiei comune asupra gospodăririi în sigurantă a combustibilului uzat si asupra gospodăririi în sigurantă a deseurilor radioactive, adoptată la Viena la 5 septembrie 1997.

De asemenea, Hotărârea C.S.A.T. nr.108/2005 prevede ca ANDRAD si Agentia Nucleară să initieze si să promoveze o Hotărâre de Guvern privind fondul de dezafectare si gospodărire a deseurilor radioactive.

Principalele acte normative în vigoare referitoare la gospodărirea deseurilor radioactive sunt:

- Legea nr.111/1996 privind desfăsurarea în sigurantă, reglementarea, autorizarea si controlul activitătilor nucleare, republicată în Monitorul Oficial al României, Partea I, nr.552 din 27 iunie 2006;

- Legea nr.105/1999 pentru ratificarea Conventiei comune asupra gospodăririi în sigurantă a combustibilului nuclear uzat si asupra gospodăririi în sigurantă a deseurilor radioactive, adoptată la Viena la 5 septembrie 1997, publicată în Monitorul Oficial al României, Partea I, nr. 283 din 21 iunie 1999;

- Ordonanta Guvernului nr.11/2003 privind gospodărirea în sigurantă a deseurilor radioactive, republicată în Monitorul Oficial al României, Partea I, nr.289 din 2 mai 2007;

- Hotărârea Guvernului nr.1601/2003 privind organizarea si functionarea Agentiei Nationale pentru Deseuri Radioactive, publicată în Monitorul Oficial al României, Partea I, nr.33 din 15 ianuarie 2004;

- Hotărârea Guvernului nr.123/2007 privind stabilirea cuantumului contributiilor anuale directe ale titularilor de autorizatie nucleară pentru anul 2007;

- Ordin nr. 1255/622/2004 pentru aprobarea Normelor metodologice privind modul de colectare a contributiilor anuale directe ale titularilor de autorizatie nucleară si de utilizare a veniturilor extrabugetare din care se finantează activitatea Agentiei Nationale pentru Deseuri Radioactive, publicată în Monitorul Oficial al României, Partea I, nr.821 din 6 septembrie 2004;

- Ordin presedintelui Agentiei Nucleare nr.844/2004 al pentru aprobarea Strategiei nationale pe termen mediu si lung privind gestionarea combustibilului nuclear uzat si a deseurilor radioactive, inclusiv depozitarea definitivă si dezafectarea instalatiilor nucleare si radiologice, publicată în Monitorul Oficial al României, Partea I, nr.818 din 6 septembrie 2004;

- Hotărâre Guvernului nr.1259/2002 privind aprobarea Strategiei nationale de dezvoltare a domeniului nuclear în România si a Planului de actiune pentru implementarea acestei strategii, publicată în Monitorul Oficial al României, Partea I, nr.851 din 26 noiembrie 2002.

Prof.Dr. D. Ciurchea
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duci
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Posted - 09/29/2007 :  15:35:29  Show Profile  Email Poster Send duci a Private Message  Reply with Quote
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Marti, 18 Septembrie 2007

Fond pentru depozitarea deșeurilor radioactive

Simona POPA (simona.popa@telegrafonline.ro)


Compania Nuclearelectrica, operatorul Centralei de la Cernavodă, va fi obligată să contribuie financiar la depozitarea deșeurilor radioactive și dezafectarea unor unități nuclearoelectrice, iar titularii de autorizații în domeniu vor fi clasificați în două categorii, în funcție de deșeurile produse, potrivit unei hotărîri de Guvern. Titularii de autorizație pentru activități nucleare vor fi clasificați ca: deținători de unități nuclearoelectrice de producție la CNE Cernavodă - mari producători de deșeuri radioactive - și institute de cercetare sau spitale - mici producători de deșeuri. Actul normativ prevede că deținătorii de unități nuclearoelectrice de producție au obligația de a plăti două tipuri de contribuții: contribuții anuale pentru constituirea resurselor financiare necesare dezafectării fiecărei unități nuclearoelectrice și contribuții anuale directe pentru constituirea fondurilor necesare depozitării definitive a deșeurilor radioactive produse prin operarea și dezafectarea acestora. Cuantumul contribuțiilor este determinat de estimările separate de cost pentru dezafectarea fiecărei unități și depozitarea definitivă a deșeurilor radioactive rezultate, stabilite pe baza studiilor întocmite în acest scop. Nuclearelectrica va putea să solicite Autorității Naționale de Reglementare în domeniul Energiei să recunoască cheltuielile cu aceste operațiuni în tarife. Contribuțiile vor fi defalcate în tranșe lunare egale și virate separat, pînă la data de 10 a fiecărei luni, în conturile bancare deschise de Agenția Națională pentru Deșeuri Radioactive (ANDR). Contribuțiile anuale pentru dezafectare se vor achita pe durata de viață proiectată a unităților nuclearoelectrice, iar cele anuale directe pentru depozitare definitivă vor fi plătite pe durata de exploatare a acestora. Micii producători de deșeuri radioactive vor achita contravaloarea serviciului de depozitare definitivă a coletelor cu deșeuri radioactive.

Prof.Dr. D. Ciurchea
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duci
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Posted - 10/08/2007 :  19:23:53  Show Profile  Email Poster Send duci a Private Message  Reply with Quote
Comentariile Greenpeace la raportul de mediu pentru unitatile 3 si 4 de la Cernavoda


CERNAVODA 3 and 4
Comments on the EIA scoping documentation
DOCUMENT CODE: U3/U4-08233-6021-DMD Rew.0
Jan Haverkamp, 23 October 2006

1. Introduction

This report consists of an analysis of the scoping documentation for the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) made available to the non-Romanian speaking public on the website of the Romanian Ministry of Environment on:
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1.1 Main Conclusions of the Analysis

This analysis concludes that the Environmental Impact Assessment scoping report as published here should not be approved by the Romanian Ministry for Environment because the EIA scoping report shows that the building of the Cernavoda 3 and 4 Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) is not a least-impact solution to address the need of energy services in Romania and the Southern Balkans; Cernavoda 3 and 4 as proposed do not offer the stand of technology of today; as well as because of the fact that the report fails to address important issues. On top of that, the report knows several procedural shortcomings that need to be addressed before it can be accepted.

Main concerns include:

  • The report does not at all address the risk of terrorist attack on Cernavoda 3 and 4 and their related interim waste storage facilities, nor the environmental consequences of such attacks. Our analysis concludes that Cernavoda 3 and 4 as proposed do not offer the best available technology for prevention of environmental impacts of such attacks. Neither does the best available nuclear technology of today offer sufficient protection of the public and environment against the impacts of serious terrorist attacks on nuclear power stations. The best available technology in this respect is offered by energy efficiency technologies combined by renewable energy technologies.

  • The risk of impacts of earthquakes is only very limitedly investigated in the report and needs to be expanded. On the basis of the provided information a proper GREENPEACE CERNAVODA 3 and 4 conclusion about the vulnerability of nuclear power plants in Cernavoda cannot be drawn.

  • The report misses a meteorological analysis of the spread of radioactivity in the case of severe accidents. This makes an assessment of environmental impacts of such events impossible.

  • The report misses an investigation into possible health effects of ongoing radioactive emissions, as well as a proper epidemiological base-line description.

  • The issue of nuclear waste is inadequately addressed, leaving out completely the situation after 50 years of interim storage of spent fuel. As this constitutes one of the largest environmental effects of Cernavoda 3 and 4 under optimal operation conditions, this is an inadmissible omission. We conclude that as long as no solution for final storage of nuclear waste exists and is adequately described in the EIA scoping report, the report cannot be approved.

  • The full costs of the Cernavoda 3 and 4 project are not described, making it impossible to compare the project with other possible alternatives. The description of costs presented gives an unacceptably distorted picture of the situation.

  • Not all viable alternatives of the Cernavoda 3 and 4 project are included and sufficiently described. Without such alternatives no proper assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of the project can be made.

  • The present Romanian Energy Strategy appears to be completely outdated and does not include logical alternative policy pathways for comparison. This means that either the EIA will have to address these or the Romanian Energy Strategy will have to be updated first including a full set of alternative scenario's before it can function as a basis of this EIA study.

  • The in the report so called “Romania's Policy in Nuclear Power Field” consists of a copy-and-paste of a text from a nuclear lobbying conference. To include this in a serious EIA scoping study is nothing else than embarrassing.


1.2 Procedural Problems with the EIA scoping Report

It must be noticed, that the English language EIA scoping report could only be found over Romanian language web-pages, which make it less accessible to non-Romanian public than provided for in article 2 paragraph 6, and article 4 paragraph 2 of the Espoo Convention and article 4 of the Aarhus Convention.

There is no indication given in the English language on how the foreign public can participate in the EIA scoping or EIA procedure, which is in breach with the Espoo Convention article 2 paragraph 6.

The quality of the English translation is low, leaving open the possibility of misinterpretation. As example, this includes indications of financing (page 6: “Project Company created by SN SA together with the private investors from country and abroad”, which would indicate (the investors) that there are already investors designated, which is not true), and price (2.2 million Euro instead of 2.2 Billion Euro). Also this is in breach of Espoo Convention article 2 paragraph 6.

DEMAND: We demand that the EIA scoping report is re-worked by a native language English speaker with knowledge of CANDU technology in order to make it more comprehensible.

DEMAND: We demand on the basis of the Espoo and Aarhus Conventions that the full EIA documentation is made available for public scrutiny – in both the Romanian and the English language.

2. Nuclear accident analyses missing in the EIA scoping report

The EIA scoping report misses several crucial parts for the evaluation of impacts of the Cernavoda 3 and 4 reactors on the environment.

2.1. No analysis of consequences of terrorist attack on the reactor or interim waste storage

In its section on possible incidents and accidents, the report fails to analyse one category of accidents that after the attacks of 11 September 2001 according to experts should be considered in the category of a frequency larger than 10-6 – the category of terrorist or military attack. This category is extremely important, because it can result in large scale emissions of radioactive substances into the environment.

The reactor building's parameters as given in the EIA scoping report show clearly it will not be able to withstand the impact of a larger air plane or an airborne or land-based missile attack. It scores far lower on safety against such an incident than the containment of the European Pressurized Reactor (EPR) under construction in Finland by the French firm Areva. With this, the proposed reactor building for Cernavoda 3 and 4 does not fulfil with this,the level of best available nuclear technology.

Analyses have shown that even the EPR is not sufficiently strong to survive the impact of a larger passenger air plane.1 The Cernavoda design will most likely not survive the impact of smaller air plane or rocket attacks. The Cernavoda NPP would not be able to protect the public sufficiently against larger radioactive emissions after a terrorist attackthe public sufficiently against larger radioactive emissions after a terrorist attack with an air plane or rocket.with an air plane or rocket

Due to lack of lay-out drawings in the provided documentation, it is difficult to estimate to what extend other buildings (emergency power supply, secondary control room, emergency cooling system etc.) could be impacted in case of a terrorist attack.

Also other scenario's for terrorist attack are not investigated (e.g. targeted acts of sabotage of vital functions, armed or non-armed infiltration into the control room(s)).

Environmental impacts of such an accident are not analysed at all within this EIA scoping report.

DEMAND: We demand a full analysis of the environmental impacts of possible terrorist attack with a larger passenger air plane on Cernavoda. This should include impacts from the attacked reactor as well as cumulative impacts from the neighbouring reactors. We demand a full analysis of possible acts of sabotage of vital functions, and of the damage that could be done after infiltration of terrorists into the control room.

DEMAND: We demand publication of lay-out charts of the different buildings in order to enable the public to judge security of vital functions.

An over-all analysis of this situation should take into consideration alternative ways to meet the need for energy service demands in the Romania and Southern Balkans and their vulnerability to terrorist attack. Greenpeace's and WISE/NIRS's analyses reveal that the best available technology to address these needs and at the same time offer security for the population against the impacts of terrorist attacks is delivered by a decentralised combination of energy efficiency measures and renewable energy sources. This option is not at all investigated in the Environmental Impact Assessment report.

DEMAND: We demand in the Environmental Impact Assessment a full comparative analysis of the impacts of possible terrorist attacks of a full spectrum of scenario's to meet needed energy service demands.

2.2 The risk of earthquake impacts

The Reactor Building is designed with DBE level earthquake resistance. There is no further description in the report to support this claim and thus it is impossible to assess what the effects of a larger earthquake on the building could be.
Furthermore an in-depth geological assessment is missing, whereas literature shows that earthquakes with quite some strength did occur near Cernavoda over the last century.

DEMAND: We demand a full analysis of the geological situation of the Cernavoda site and an in-depth description of possible impacts of seismic activity on the reactor building. We also demand more technical information on the earthquake resistance of the building.

2.3 There is no meteorological analysis of spreading of radioactivity in case of a heavy accident

As a severe accident (either because of terrorist attack, internal sabotage, military attack or a beyond design technical and/or human failure) cannot be completely excluded, the EIA report should contain a meteorological analysis of the spreading of radioactivity from Cernavoda. On that basis it is easier to investigate what the environmental impacts of such accidents can be and whether the proposed catastrophe plans and emergency regulations can be considered sufficient. It also will give the public a better qualitative image of reality.

DEMAND: We demand a full meteorological analysis of the spreading of radioactive substances after a largest thinkable accident.

3. Insufficient analysis of emissions, fuel chain and radioactive waste

3.1 Missing analysis of possible health effects of ongoing radioactive emissions

Tritium and D2O leakages are well known negative features of the CANDU design. Whereas the report describes that 18.000 m3 radioactive fluid effluents are produced annually, it fails to describe what the impact of these effluents is on the environment and on human health. Also more general epidemiological analyses miss. There is even no epidemiological study of the possible effects of Cernavoda 1 on the population, flora and fauna, which could be used indicatively for the reactors 3 and 4. Also base-line health statistics that could be used for interpreting the effects of Cernavoda 3 and 4 later are completely missing.

The study furthermore fails to address the issue of cumulative effects of the emissions of four CANDU reactors on health and environment.

DEMAND: We demand the inclusion of extensive epidemiological research on the environmental and health consequences of the ongoing liquid and gaseous radioactive emissions of Cernavoda 1 to be taken up in the EIA. We furthermore demand a detailed description of the environmental and epidemiological health effects that can be expected from Cernavoda 3 and 4 as well as of cumulative effects of Cernavoda 1 to 4.

3.2 Inadequate analysis of the nuclear waste situation

Although the report describes the on-site interim storage for radioactive wastes, it does not describe what happens after interim storage. In order to be able to make a full comparison between this project and various alternatives a full description of the fuel chain is necessary.

DEMAND: We demand a full description of the fuel chain from ore to final storage with a complete estimation of environmental impacts.

The report states that “The high radioactive wastes, including also the spent fuel, after minimum 50 years of intermediate storage on NPP platform will be ultimately stored in a national geologic deposit.” This premiss cannot be held. Romania does not have a national geological deposit available and experiences worldwide show that finding any is extremely difficult. To state that this will happen, when in reality nothing is prepared yet means practically shifting this problem to a future generation. This goes head-on against the basis of sustainability, in which the present generation promises not to burden next generations with today's problems. Cernavoda 3 and 4 are basically going to produce waste for which there is no solution. If indeed no solution exists, this should be the end of the project. Shifting the solution to next generations is irresponsible and unacceptable.

DEMAND: We demand that this Environmental Impact Assessment is not approved as long as there is no final solution for what happens with the high radioactive wastes after interim storage.

4. Costs of Cernavoda 3 and 4

4.1 “Performance of units 3 and 4 from Cernavoda NPP”1

In order to be able to compare different alternatives and options for meeting the energy needs of Romania, and on that basis also the environmental impacts of these options, it is important to have a clear picture of the true costs of Cernavoda 3 and 4.

A decisive factor in the costs of a nuclear power plant is building time. The report fails to mention that the construction of Cernavoda 2 is already heavily behind schedule.

Another important factor in costs is the market. The report states that when Cernavoda 2 will go on-line, Cernavoda will cover 20% of Romania's electricity demand. This is a highly debatable statement, as the report fails to mention that Romania plans to increase its exports of electricity. It should be clearly noted in this Environmental Impact Assessment that Cernavoda 3 and 4 also will mainly target foreign markets.

Paragraph II.1.3 (titled “Performance of units 3 and 4 from Cernavoda NPP”) of the report does not give any information on the performance of units 3 and 4 of the Cernavoda NPP. Expected would be information on needed investments, output prices, proposed support measures (capping of liabilities, subsidies, price regulations, indirect subsidies over back-end provisions, state guarantees, etc.).

DEMAND: In order to put the assessment of environmental impacts of Cernavoda 3 and 4 in comparison with alternatives into the proper perspective we demand that the public is granted within this EIA full access to information on the planned financial performance of Cernavoda 3 and 4, including planned direct and indirect state subsidies and other financial incentives.

4.2 “The Strategic Evaluation of Unit 3 & Unit 4 Finalization”

The cost analysis in paragraph II 1.3.1 of the report reads more as a sales leaflet than that it is based on real numbers. The perceived advantages of using existing construction work and infrastructure look strongly inflated, especially as the quality of earlier work was in the past criticised.

The claim that the costs include full waste management and decommissioning costs as well as disposal costs is non-transparent – there are no references given how large these costs will be, on which assumptions this is based, and to which extend these costs indeed are included. These claims are furthermore partially highly speculative (disposal costs will have to be determined on the basis of non-existing long term disposal / storage techniques – see paragraph 3.2 above).

The cost analysis only looks at the most disadvantageous alternatives (coal, lignite and natural gas) and with those, especially in the case of natural gas, only at its least-cost-effective form. As example, natural gas used in decentralised power-heat co-generation delivers even at today's high fuel prices lower costs than the here quoted cost of nuclear.

The report gives no comparison with energy efficiency measures including system decentralisation, nor with renewable energy sources.

With this a distorted picture is given that puts nuclear power into a more positive light than it deserves.

The cost analysis furthermore does not internalise many other environmental costs of nuclear power (in uranium mining, fuel production, spent-fuel processing) as well as direct and indirect state subsidies including liability capping and other non-mentioned incentives.

DEMAND: We demand in the framework of this EIA an independent and full analysis of costs in comparison with all viable alternatives, including energy efficiency and the development of renewable resources.

5. Romanian energy policy

Construction of Cernavoda 3 and 4 is an essential part of the present Romanian Energy Policy. This is also reflected in the EIA scoping report. This policy has too many shortfalls to be able to function as basis for such an important decision as the building of an NPP.

5.1 Romania’s Energy Strategy

The fact that Romania's Energy Strategy does not take into account environmental issues like Climate Change, acidification of the atmosphere and depletion of resources, shows that this document is outdated and insufficient to function as a basis for the Environmental Impact Assessment for a nuclear power station. The Romanian Energy Strategy fails to take into account the technical and economical developments that are caused by above mentioned environmental problems, leading to false assumptions concerning the relation between GDP growth-rates and growth-rates of electricity demand.

This will inevitably lead to the building of over-capacity, leading to an unnecessary extra burden for the environment. The inherent inflexibility of nuclear generation capacity as base-load in combination with such over-capacity will lead to a more disadvantageous market position for really clean, but more decentralised and flexible energy sources like wind energy, biomass co-generation, geo-thermal energy, hydro energy and solar energy as well as energy efficiency measures.

An analysis of the needed electrical capacity between 2010 and 2015 is completely insufficient for a nuclear power project. NPPs are built for a life time of 30 years or longer and therefore the energy services needs for the entire period of lifetime needs to be drawn into consideration.

DEMAND: We demand a re-assessment of growth-data leading to a more realistic picture of needed electrical capacity, and that for the full period of 2010 to 2045.

The report wrongly assumes that nuclear energy can help with creating larger energy security (in the report wrongly translated as “energy safety”). Nuclear energy is an energy source that because of its centralised character leads to larger dependence in energy generation. In the case of Cernavoda 3 and 4 this is dependence on a limited amount of foreign sources for technical know-how, building materials, maintenance materials, solutions for back-end problems (decommissioning and spent fuel processing) and last but not least the largest part of the needed nuclear fuel.

DEMAND: We demand that a proper objective analysis is made to in what extend nuclear power can or cannot support an increase of energy security for Romania, including comparison with alternatives like investments in energy efficiency and the development of truly independent sources like wind, geo-thermal, hydro, biomass and solar energy.

Tables II in the report show that, in spite of its claims of doing so, the Romanian Energy Policy does not take into account the EU Green Paper - “Towards a European strategy for the security of energy supply”1 from 2000 – set aside that this Green Paper already is heavily outdated - nor the mentioned summits, because it fails to show any development of renewable energy resources in Romania except for hydro, which remains largely stable. This clearly shows that logical alternatives have not been taken into account.

DEMAND: We demand that in order to enable proper comparison of options, for this EIA more investigations are done to alternatives for the operation of nuclear power than are apparent from Romania's Energy Policy, which clearly fails to address these.
Greenpeace has asked the German institute DLR (Institute of Technical Thermodynamics, Department of Systems Analysis and Technology Assessment, Stuttgart) to analyse several scenario's for the development of European energy policies and concluded that the economically, socially and environmentally most profitable direction lies in a strong policy focus on decentralisation of energy generation, implementation of existing technologies for an increase in energy efficiency, and an aggressive promotion of the use of renewable energy sources like wind energy, hydro-energy, geo-thermal energy, biomass and solar energy.2 The Romanian Energy Policy that forms the basis for this EIA appears to be completely out of date in all these aspects.

DEMAND: We demand a complete overhaul of the Romania Energy Policy including serious scenario's based on nuclear phase-out, implementation and stimulation of energy efficiency measures and the aggressive development of renewable energy sources, before the EIA for Cernavoda 3 and 4 is started, so that a proper basis for comparison of options is available.

5.2 “Romania's Policy in Nuclear Power Field”

To base its nuclear policy on the basis of a European nuclear lobby conference, as happens in the EIA scoping report (the European Nuclear Assembly in March 2006 in Brussels), cannot be taken seriously. Many of the conclusions written down in this paragraph are nothing else than nuclear agitprop without scientific basis. To illustrate this I will take ad randomly every second claim in the list:

–“nuclear power represents a reliable and necessary alternative”. Reliability of nuclear power is debatable. Sudden grid problems because of unplanned shut-downs of large capacities of nuclear power are a continuing head-ache for grid operators. That nuclear power is a “necessary” alternative is a statement of value, not based on scientific reality. Europe (and Romania) can easily develop their economies without nuclear energy. As proof of that the above mentioned study could be taken that was recently carried out by the German institute DLR for Greenpeace.{3}

–“nuclear power satisfies all the requirements regarding the environmental impact and significantly contributes to the mitigation of climatic changes”. To state ex-ante that nuclear power satisfies all requirements regarding environmental impacts makes the whole effort of this EIA superfluous. It is – besides that – fundamentally untrue, as these comments on the EIA scoping report clearly illustrate. Furthermore, the claim that nuclear power can contribute “significantly” to mitigate climate change cannot be upheld. When all CO2 emissions created by nuclear power (during fuel production, transport, building activities, maintenance, decommissioning and fuel processing) are taken into account, nuclear power at present prevents less than 1% of CO2 emissions on a world-wide scale and the operation of Cernavoda will not add much to that number. This makes nuclear power maximally a marginal contributor to the mitigation of climate change. When compared to other alternatives (energy efficiency, the development of renewable energy sources), nuclear power appears to be one of the most inefficient ways to tackle climate change.

–“nuclear power is competitive related to other forms of energy generation and for predictable periods, it is characterized by a great stability of production costs, if compared to the energy produced with fossil fuels;”. Reality is that at present no nuclear power project can survive without direct and/or indirect government funding and/or price regulations. Under the Vienna and Paris conventions, nuclear power plants are not required to insure their own liability, but only a ridiculously low cap with national governments covering the remainder. Back-end costs are in most cases partly carried by national government budgets – ex-ante or as in the recent example of the BE buy-out by the British government ex-post. Nuclear operations receive state guarantees where other techniques on the market do not get these. The list can be continued. This means that nuclear power is not competitive at all in a free market. On top of this, it only can give stability of production costs as long as the development of nuclear energy is stagnating. Were over-all nuclear energy capacity growing, well before the end of the planned life time of Cernavoda 3 and 4 uranium prices would start soaring exponentially due to depletion of economically viable uranium resources. Finally, nuclear power may give a more stable price picture today than fossil fuels, cost price stability of other alternatives like biomass, hydro, geo-thermal, wind and solar is far higher than that of nuclear power.

–“the perception and acceptance of the nuclear power by the public is more consistent and positive.” This is directly contradicted by the regular Euro-barometer opinion polls. It is true that perception and acceptance are consistent – they are EU-wide consistently negative with a majority of EU citizens consistently dismissing expansion of nuclear power. The only breach with this trend can be shown in nuclear industry led polls, in which questions have been framed such as to lead to an outcome more positive to nuclear power. Reality is that EU citizens are sceptical about nuclear power because they do not see a solution for nuclear waste, they still remember the impact of the Chernobyl catastrophe and rightly are not convinced that a chance on another accident with a similar impact can be excluded, and they see nuclear installations as dangerous possible terrorist targets.

The text wrongly concludes that the International Energy Agency (IEA) talks about a necessity of nuclear power. These studies were made on the premiss that nuclear power will be with us for some time – they basically extrapolate the status-quo. Other studies that look more into the alternatives come to the valid conclusion that nuclear power is not necessary to meet our needs and at the same time mitigate climate change. An example:
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That scenarios predicting 1500 GWe installed nuclear capacity in 2050 worldwide would be realistic, as quoted in the EIA scoping report, is highly debatable and rather a product of nuclear PR spin. There is a general consensus amongst producers of nuclear power generation capacity that the maximum realisable increase in nuclear capacity has its physical limits – and these limits are at least 30% lower than claimed here.

The so called “non-Governmental Organisations” the report mentions as supportive to nuclear energy are all directly related to the nuclear industry. The report fails to mention the large spectrum of true (not industry-related) independent NGOs in Romania, and beyond, that oppose nuclear energy. The report with that becomes rather a nuclear PR brochure than a serious EIA scoping study.

DEMAND: We demand a complete re-assessment of this part of the EIA scoping on the basis of non-biased information – i.e. Information not coming from the realm of nuclear PR.

6. Epilogue – a weak EIA scoping report

In this analysis, Greenpeace only highlights some of the many short-comings of the report. We do not go into detail on the issue that there is no proper zero analysis within the report, which makes it virtually impossible to compare most of the data. We also will not go into detail on the many purely descriptive status-quo paragraphs that fail to point out to what the consequences – the impacts – of Cernavoda 3 and 4 will be.

This EIA scoping report shows in its first chapters that it had to be written in order to sell nuclear power – not to give a scientific basis for the debate about environmental impacts of Cernavoda 3 and 4 and possible alternatives.

In what is written, there are several reasons to dismiss the whole project of Cernavoda 3 and 4; most strikingly the paragraphs showing the complete lack of solutions for high radioactive waste.
In what is not written there are even more reasons to dismiss the project:

  • the missing alternatives;

  • the missing analysis of the risks of terrorist attack;

  • the missing analysis of the impacts of a large accident;


But above all the missing necessity for this project.

Greenpeace therefore demands from the Romanian Ministry for Environment and Waters that it will not approve this EIA scoping report.

Next to that it should start a discussion within the Romanian cabinet to address Romania's energy policy in a more future-oriented way. The backbone of such a discussion would logically be the development of a decentralised energy structure, increase of energy efficiency and the development of renewable energy sources. Only in that way will Romania be able to mitigate its role in Global Warming and at the same time guarantee its citizens a secure, stable and affordable energy supply on the long term.





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Comments on the EIA scoping documentation {1}
ir. Jan Haverkamp
Consultant for nuclear energy in Central Europe
Nad Bo#345;islavkou 58
CZ – 160 00 Praha
Czech Republic
tel.: +420.603.569 243
fax/tel.:+420.235 361 734
e-mail: jan.haverkamp@diala.greenpeace.org
jan.haverkamp@wisebrno.cz
Central European energy campaign
World Information Service on Energy
WISE / NIRS Brno

Ir. Jan Haverkamp is an independent consultant for nuclear energy issues in Central Europe for the organisations Greenpeace and WISE/NIRS Brno. He has 20 years experience in the field.



NOTES

p3: 1 Large and Associates, Assessment of the operational risks and hazards of the EPR when subject to aircraft crash, Amsterdam (2006) Greenpeace International; ttp://You must be logged in to see this link.


1The report wrongly refers to the “EU Green Chart - “To a European Strategy Based on Energy Supply Safety””
2Sven Teske (editor), Dr.Wolfram Krewitt, Dr Uwe Klann, Stefan Kronshage: Energy Revolution: A Sustainable Pathway to a Clean Energy Future for Europe; a European Energy Scenario for the EU-25, Amsterdam (2005) Greenpeace International / DLR, Institute of Technical Thermodynamics, Department of Systems Analysis and Technology Assessment, Stuttgart; Internet: You must be logged in to see this link.
3ibidem

1Titles in italic and between quotation marks are taken over as found from the EIA scoping report titles, including mistakes in English.

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Posted - 11/23/2009 :  15:14:10  Show Profile  Email Poster Send duci a Private Message  Reply with Quote
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Sell AECL to India

Canada wants to sell CANDU nuclear reactors to India. A better idea is to sell India the whole company

Ron Banerjee, Financial Post
Published: Friday, November 20, 2009

With Prime Minister Stephen Harper's recent trip to India, a lot of attention has been focused on the possibility of saving AECL, a federally owned crown corporation, by selling CANDU nuclear reactors to India. Considerable evidence suggests that this scenario is unlikely. A better, more realistic way to rescue the Canadian nuclear industry would be to sell AECL to India and use Indian technology for our next generation of Ontario reactors.

To understand why, it is necessary to look at various technological options and the tortuous history of Indo-Canadian nuclear ties.

AECL and its CANDU nuclear reactors are stuck between a rock and a hard place. Domestically, CANDU reactors have suffered from massive cost overruns and prolonged shutdowns. The sluggish Ontario economy and reduced electricity consumption means that, at best, AECL may look forward to some refurbishment work on older units and the construction of two new units in Canada over the next decade.

Internationally, things look even grimmer. Europe seems to have bet on AREVA's reactors while America is considering AREVA and Westinghouse designs. South Korea and China, which had purchased six CANDUs, have also chosen to look at AREVA, Westinghouse and GE models.

Other CANDU customers include small states with fragile economies, namely Romania and Argentina. Any potential deals would be small and uncertain.

There are reasons why CANDU is such a hard sell internationally. Compared to our Russian, European and American rivals, Canada has less to offer in terms of export credits, industrial offsets and diplomatic arm-twisting.

Additionally, all the rival firms produce light water reactors, which require enriched uranium. CANDU, on the other hand, uses heavy water reactors, which rely on natural uranium and heavy water as a moderator.

This difference underscores a key problem with a proposed privatization (sale) of AECL and its CANDU. The most likely purchasers are AREVA, GE and Westinghouse, the very manufacturers which make competing reactors based on the completely different light water technology.

These firms would be highly unlikely to introduce CANDU heavy water technology into their overseas portfolios, given the radical differences between the two technologies. In fact, the biggest incentive for these firms to purchase CANDU would be to eliminate a competitor in overseas markets, while also getting a piece of Ontario's upcoming award of two new reactors.

The Ontario government seems determined to award this contract to AECL to protect domestic jobs and buttress a "national champion." Buying CANDU seems to be the only way for foreign reactor-makers to participate.

To slash costs, we can expect that any of these firms will try to standardize components among all of their units, both here and overseas. This means that even CANDU reactors built for Ontario will include increasing portions of foreign components.

The net result would likely be zero opportunities for CANDU outside Canada, and a gradually shrinking share of components for CANDUs sold domestically.


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On its own, CANDU has poor prospects for international sales and is reliant on domestic sales. Clearly, this is not sustainable.

Selling AECL to anyone would yield immediate funds for a beleaguered government and an end to state subsidies. To get more from a sale, though, Canada should look at an alternative buyer rather than AREVA, GE or Westinghouse.

There is only one other nation in the world which has selected the same heavy water reactor technology as CANDU. India bought and evaluated two CANDUs and two American light water reactors in the late 1960s. Due to a shortage of domestic uranium, India decided to base a massive domestic nuclear program on heavy water technology.

India has built 17 reactors and is constructing six more currently. Indian heavy water reactors have been a scintillating success and, according to the Journal of Nuclear Engineering and Design, have achieved over 90% capacity utilization in the last decade. By contrast, the Ontario Clean Air Alliance reports the province's fleet of CANDUs sported a 65% utilization rate in 2005. The Canadian Nuclear Society claims an overall CANDU fleet performance of closer to 80%.

India's NPCIL has been able to lower costs and outperform AECL thanks to a massive pool of technical talent and an enormous, ever-expanding economy with increasing energy demands. The energy requirements are so high that NPCIL cannot construct heavy water reactors quickly enough, and needs to purchase foreign reactors. This led to the Indo-U. S. nuclear deal, which allows India to buy foreign reactors as long as they are open to inspections and used for civilian (non-military) purposes.

Multi-billion dollar deals have already been signed with Russian manufacturers and AREVA, while negotiations with Westinghouse are ongoing. The stakes are massive: India will deploy reactors worth $40-billion in the next decade. Half of these will be imported.

Over the next seven years, NPCIL plans to build eight indigenous 700 megawatt (MW) heavy water reactors and a 500 MW fast-breeder reactor, in addition to contracts with foreign manufacturers. When chairman S.K. Jain was asked how so many reactors could be built, he bluntly stated that NPCIL was cash-rich and had billions of dollars in reserve.

Given that India is familiar with heavy water technology, one would think that CANDUs would have a better chance than other reactors. However, the contracts signed so far have been for the unfamiliar light water reactors built by CANDU competitors.

This baffling situation is due primarily to historic boondoggles perpetrated by previous Liberal administrations. In 1973, India tested nuclear weapons despite not being signatories to the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT). India refused to sign the NPT because neighbouring China, which had attacked India in 1962, was permitted under the NPT to possess nuclear weapons.

Canada accused India of using Canadian-supplied reactors to build the first elements of her nuclear arsenal. The Liberal government then took a fateful decision that ultimately resulted in CANDU's current predicament: It suspended all nuclear cooperation with India.


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As a result, India developed an indigenous series of heavy water reactors that dramatically outperform CANDUs in performance and cost attributes.

According to University of Toronto professor Arthur Rubinoff, no nation reacted more harshly to India's 1998 nuclear tests than Jean Chretien-led Canada. The Liberals recalled Canada's ambassador, cancelled trade talks and urged the world community to take harsh action.

These actions, akin to cutting off one's nose to spite one's face, explains why despite the similarities, it is AREVA and the Russians who have scored reactor sales in India rather than CANDU.

Our Conservative government has tried valiantly to reverse bitterness created by self-destructive Liberal policies. Voting in favour of the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal was the first step. Mr. Harper and his huge delegation to India emphasized eagerness to resume nuclear trade.

Canada may have already missed the bus on this file, however. Obstruction from non-proliferation zealots within Canada's legendary bureaucracy has resulted in Russia and France leapfrogging us and signing reactor deals. Also, the Indians are nervous about the minority status of Stephen Harper's government and how an alternate regime may deal with India.

Additionally, the more advanced state of the Indian nuclear industry and superior performance of Indian reactors raise legitimate questions about whether there are any advantages to buying CANDU.

On the other hand, rescuing AECL with Indian ownership would have obvious benefits.

India is developing a new thorium reactor -- an element both India and Canada have in abundance -- which will be the world's cleanest and safest. With its enormous clout, size and access to low-cost technological solutions, India is much better positioned to achieve global sales.

The participation of an Indianowned AECL in India's massive domestic nuclear program, as well as potential Indian-led foreign sales efforts, would be likely to generate more employment and benefits for Canada's nuclear industry. It is clearly a more attractive proposition than the futility of a small independent player competing against muscular, better capitalized foreign firms backed by superpowers.

India has achieved a tremendous track record of rescuing faltering foreign firms in places like Europe. Britain has sold the remnants of its auto industry (Jaguar Land Rover) to an Indian firm and recently pledged funding to the Tata Group for the production of an electric car in the U.K.

Tata Steel has also purchased and overhauled Europe's largest steel manufacturer, Corus Steel.

Europeans have entrusted Indian behemoths to rescue such important strategic industries as steel and automotive sectors. There is no reason why Canada's faltering AECL cannot benefit from Indian ownership as well. It may be our only ticket to saving the nuclear industry.

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Posted - 01/27/2010 :  15:54:04  Show Profile  Email Poster Send duci a Private Message  Reply with Quote
'Sustainable' fission?
11 December 2009
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Scientist David Mackay evaluates how much uranium we would need to to keep the lights on for 1000 years
"Known mineable resources of uranium, shared between six billion people, would last for 1000 years, but only at a rate of 0.55kWh per person per day"

How great are the worldwide supplies of uranium? Do we have only a few decades' worth of uranium, or do we have enough for millennia? To estimate a sustainable power from uranium, I took the total recoverable uranium in the ground and in seawater, divided it fairly between six billion humans, and asked: #8220;How fast can we use this if it has to last 1000 years?#8221;

Almost all the recoverable uranium is in the oceans, not in the ground: seawater contains 3.3mg of uranium per cubic metre of water, which amounts to 4.5 billion tons worldwide. I called the uranium in the ocean "recoverable", but this is a bit inaccurate : most ocean waters are quite inaccessible, and the ocean conveyor belt rolls round only once every 1000 years or so; and no-one has yet demonstrated uranium-extraction from seawater on an industrial scale. So we'll make separate estimates for two cases: first using only mined uranium, and second using ocean uranium too.

The uranium ore in the ground that is extractable at prices below $130/kgU is about one thousandth of the amount in seawater (4.5 million tons). If prices went above $130/kg, phosphate deposits that contain uranium at low concentrations would become economic to mine. (Recovery of uranium from phosphates is perfectly possible, and was done in the USA and Belgium before1998). For the estimate of mined uranium, I will add both the conventional uranium ore and the phosphates, to give a total resource of 27 million tons of uranium.

A once-through 1000MW nuclear power station uses 162tU/y. So the known mineable resources of uranium, shared between six billion people, would last for 1000 years if we produced nuclear power at a rate of 0.55kWh per person per day. This sustainable rate is the output of just 136 nuclear power stations, and is half of today#8217;s nuclear power production. The average European energy consumption is 125kWh per day per person. It's very possible this is an underestimate of uranium's potential, since, as there is not yet a uranium shortage, there is no incentive for exploration and little uranium exploration has been undertaken since the 1980s; so maybe more mineable uranium will be discovered.

But could our current once-through use of mined uranium be sustainable? It is hard to say, since there is such uncertainty about the result of future exploration. Certainly at today's rate of consumption, once-through reactors could keep going for hundreds of years. But if we wanted to crank up nuclear power 40-fold worldwide, in order to get off fossil fuels, we might worry that once-through reactors are not a sustainable technology.

Uranium can be used 60 times more efficiently in fast breeder reactors, which burn up all the uranium; both the U-238 and the U-235. As long as we do not throw away the spent fuel that is spat out by once-through reactors, this source of depleted uranium could be used too. If we used all the mineable uranium (plus the depleted uranium stockpiles) in fast breeder reactors, the power would be 33kWh per day per person.

The oceans' uranium, if completely extracted and used in once-through reactors, corresponds to a total energy of 28 million GW-years per planet.

How fast could uranium be extracted from the oceans? The oceans circulate slowly: half of the water is in the Pacific Ocean, and deep Pacific waters circulate to the surface on the great ocean conveyor only every 1600 years. Let's imagine that 10% of the uranium is extracted over such a 1600-year period. That's an extraction rate of 280,000t/y. In once-through reactors, this would deliver power at a rate of 1750GW (around four times the current installed nuclear capacity), which, shared between 6 billion people, is 7kWh per day per person. I conclude that ocean extraction of uranium could turn today's once-through reactors into a "sustainable" option; assuming that the uranium reactors can cover the energy cost of the ocean extraction process.

If fast reactors are 60 times more efficient, the same extraction of ocean uranium could deliver 420kWh per day per person. At last, a sustainable figure that beats current consumption! but only with the joint help of two technologies that are respectively scarcely-developed and unfashionable: ocean extraction of uranium, and fast breeder reactors.

So is the potential contribution of ocean-uranium-based power economically plausible? Japanese researchers have found a to extract uranium from seawater at a cost of $100#8211;300/kgU, in comparison with a current cost of about $20/kgU from ore.

We are not home yet: does the Japanese technique scale up? In the Japanese experiment, three cages full of adsorbent uranium-attracting material weighing 350kg collected more than 1kg of yellow cake in 240 days; this figure corresponds to about 1.6kg/y. The cages had a cross-sectional area of 48m2. To power a once-through 1GW nuclear power station, we need a production rate 100,000 times greater than the Japanese experiment#8217;s. If we simply scaled up the Japanese technique, which accumulated uranium passively from the sea, a power of 1GW would thus need cages having a collecting area of 4.8km2 and containing a weight of 350,000t of adsorbent material #8211; more than the weight of the steel in the 1000MW reactor itself.


Author Info:
An extract from Sustainable Energy without hot air by David JC MacKay. David MacKay was appointed to be Chief Scientific Advisor of the UK's Department of Energy and Climate Change in September 2009.

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Posted - 02/02/2010 :  15:10:28  Show Profile  Email Poster Send duci a Private Message  Reply with Quote
Europe launches nuclear academy
29 January 2010

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The European Nuclear Energy Leadership Academy (Enela) has been launched. The academy aims to attract university graduates to the nuclear energy sector and to train future leaders in this field.

The founding treaty establishing the academy has been signed by six nuclear energy-related companies: Areva, Axpo, EnBW, EOn Kernkraft, Urenco and Vattenfall. The partners also held their first shareholders meeting at the same time as signing the treaty, which covers the essential strategic, legal and financial aspects of the academy.

Enela was initiated by the industrial stakeholders in the European Nuclear Energy Forum (Enef), set up by the European Commission in 2007 as a platform for a broad stakeholder discussion on opportunities, risks and transparency issues of nuclear energy.

In a joint statement, the founding partners said: "In the wake of Europe's nuclear energy renaissance, the purpose of the academy is to train young graduates and high potential employees with different backgrounds to become leaders or to prepare them to take broader responsibilities in European nuclear energy corporations and institutions."

Enela will be located in Germany at the Garching campus of the Technical University Munich. Jean-Claude Gauthier, senior vice president of Areva NP is designated to be the first director of Enela. The academy's program - which will begin in 2011 - will offer both a comprehensive nuclear energy management program and a leadership cycle based on a theoretical and practical approach focusing on specific European requirements and specifications, with regards to economics, politics, technology, legislation, safety standards and certifications. The academy will also serve as a think-tank, bringing together members of the international nuclear community, comprising employers, prospective employees, as well as political and social opinion leaders.

"This is a very important and unique signal," said Stephan Döhler, executive vice president of Axpo. "The academy addresses the strong need for joining our efforts in attracting and training on an international level the best heads for the European nuclear energy community." Walter Hohlefelder of EOn Kernkraft added: "Today marks the birth of what could become in the future the one European institution in the field of nuclear energy management and leadership training. Enela welcomes further organizations and institutions to support or join the initiative."

EU energy commissioner Andris Piebalgs welcomed Enela's establishment, saying: "The nuclear sector faces a serious challenge: it needs to keep and develop knowledge on nuclear at an appropriate level. This is a matter of concern not only to the industry, but also for researchers, regulators and the health sector." He added, "Enela, by focussing on leadership skills, can help to close the gap in existing training programs."

Researched and written
by World Nuclear News

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Posted - 02/11/2010 :  17:02:43  Show Profile  Email Poster Send duci a Private Message  Reply with Quote
Romanian reactor contract for AECL
09 February 2010

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Engineering consultation work is to be carried out by Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd (AECL) towards the completion of two units at Romania's Cernavoda nuclear power plant.



How Cernavoda would look with four units (Image: AECL)



The contract will see AECL provide consulting services in the nuclear safety and engineering fields to define the requirements for the completion of the two Candu 6 pressurised heavy water reactor units at Cernavoda. Specifically, the Canadian company will undertake activities such as design, authorisation and assessment of the existing infrastructure and safety conditions at Cernavoda 3 and 4. The deal was made by AECL and EnergoNuclear, a consortium of nuclear utilities and engineering firms managing the completion project.

The contract is good news for AECL, which the Canadian government is looking to 'restructure' with the company's Candu reactor unit likely to move out of government hands. AECL president and CEO Hugh MacDiarmid said the company was delighted with the EnergoNuclear connection. "Our Candu 6 reactor is the top performing reactor in the world... and we believe that this track record of high performance will continue with [Cernavoda] units 3 and 4," he said.

According to EnergoNuclear general manager Dan Ionescu, the contract is a "significant step towards the completion of units 3 and 4." Based on the experience of Cernavoda 1 and 2, Ionescu predicted that the new units would "substantially increase our nuclear energy capabilities, and provide significant new economic and employment opportunities in the region."

Romania's only nuclear power station currently comprises two operating Candu units, but was initially planned as a five-unit plant. Construction began on all five units in the early 1980s but in 1991 work was suspended on all the other units to concentrate efforts on Cernavoda 1, which started up in 1996. Work resumed on unit 2 after a government decision in 2000 to complete the unit as the least-cost route to expand the country's generating capacity, and the unit started up in 2007. Together, the two units now supply 20% of Romania's electricity.

Following on from a feasibility study on various options for the completion of units 3 and 4, EnergoNuclear SA was formally established as a joint venture in April 2009 and tasked with the construction, commissioning and operation of the two new reactors. EnergoNuclear's seven member companies are Romanian state-owned Nuclearelectrica SA (51%); Czech utility CEZ, Belgium's Electrabel (part of GDF-Suez), Enel of Italy and Germany's RWE Power, holding 9.15% each; and Iberdrola of Spain and global steel producer ArcelorMittal, with 6.2% each.

The €4 billion ($5 billion) project to complete the two 720 MWe reactors is to be conducted in two stages and is expected to take about six years. The AECL contract is part of EnergoNuclear's 18-month pre-project phase which involves the development of technical and commercial specifications, calls for bids, engineering documentation, site works and evaluation of tenders for the general contractor. The units are planned to start up in 2016 and 2017.


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Posted - 02/18/2010 :  16:53:57  Show Profile  Email Poster Send duci a Private Message  Reply with Quote
România ar putea găzdui gunoiul nuclear al UE
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Deșeurile nucleare din Uniunea Europeană ar putea fi transportate în Europa de Est, una dintre posibilele locații fiind România, pentru a fi stocate în depozite subterane, conform planurilor analizate de statele membre UE, relatează The Times în ediția electronică.

România ar putea găzdui gunoiul nuclear al UE Potrivit The Times, proiectul, realizat pe fondul reapariției interesului pentru energia nucleară, ar putea obține aprobarea Comisiei Europene la sfârșitul acestui an.
Negocierile sunt în curs de desfășurare între opt țări - Organizația europeană pentru dezvoltarea capacității de stocare din care fac parte Olanda, Italia, Polonia, România, Slovacia, Lituania, Slovenia și Bulgaria- pe tema transportării și stocării deșeurilor. Oficialii acestor țări urmează să se întâlnească din nou în luna mai.
În Slovenia, un depozit pentru deșeuri nucleare cu un nivel scăzut de radioactivitate este în construcție în localitatea Vrbina, situată în estul țării. În iulie 2009, comunitatea locală a acceptat construirea acestuia în schimbul unor despăgubiri anuale de cinci milioane de euro, potrivit Asociației nucleare mondiale.
Până în prezent, foarte puține țări din lume au construit un depozit permament pentru deșeurile lor, rezultatul nedorit al procesării combustibilului nuclear în vederea obținerii energiei. Restul țărilor păstrează materialele în instalații provizorii.
Olanda dispune numai de 30 de metri cubi de deșeuri nucleare cu un nivel înalt de radioactivitate, comparativ cu 1900 de metri cubi în Marea Britanie și un volum asemănător în Franța. Autoritățile olandeze, alături de cele germane, se opun din principiu exportării deșeurilor nucleare. Costul suportat de Olanda pentru construirea propriului său depozit ar ajunge la circa două miliarde de euro. Alte state UE implicate în proiect, precum Slovacia, Lituania și Slovania, se confruntă cu provocări similare. Deoarece au doar unul sau două reactoare, aceste țări ar prefera să suporte împreună costurile construirii unui depozit geologic. Bulgaria și România au două reactoare, în vreme ce Slovania dispune doar de un reactor pe care-l partajează cu Croația.

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Posted - 08/07/2010 :  11:32:51  Show Profile  Email Poster Send duci a Private Message  Reply with Quote
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Relațiile de prietenie energetică dintre România și Franța se vor intensifica în următorii ani pe palierul nuclear. Dacă, până acum, după anunțul României privind intenția de construire a unei a doua centrale nucleare, francezii ne dădeau târcoale pentru a primi acest contract, a venit vremea ca România să ceară ajutorul Franței, în ideea urgentării proiectului.

Cu ocazia unei vizite efectuate la Paris la începutul lunii iunie, ministrul Economiei, Adriean Videanu, a cerut companiei franceze Areva, cel mai mare constructor de centrale nucleare din lume, să aleagă amplasamentul optim pentru noua unitate din România, pe care să o și construiască.

#8222;Avem nevoie de expertiza specialiștilor francezi legat de studiul de amplasament. Pe lângă evaluarea pe care am făcut-o noi, avem nevoie să validăm aceste studii în raport cu partenerii francezi, apoi să încercăm să constituim o companie de proiect care să ducă la realizarea pool-ului investițional pentru cea de-a doua centrală nucleară", a declarat Videanu, într-un interviu acordat ziarului #8222;Adevărul".

Aceasta a explicat că vor fi puse la dispoziția reprezentanților Areva informațiile preliminare pe care le dețin autoritățile române privind posibilele amplasamente, urmând ca specialiștii francezi să stabilească poziționarea optimă pentru noua unitate producătoare de energie.

Prof.Dr. D. Ciurchea
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